Lebanon: The Middle East’s Next Flashpoint?

Nestled between mountains and the sea, Lebanon is an unusual nation state, even by Middle Eastern standards. Like many of its neighbours, it too was carved up from the remains of the collapsed Ottoman Empire in 1920, albeit less arbitrarily. Originally conceived by the French to be a Christian Middle Eastern state, Lebanon eventually came into being encompassing a vast array of religious groups including mainly Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, but also with minorities of Greek Orthodox, Druze and Armenian Christians.

Unsurprisingly the religious differences between various groups was seen as a potential flashpoint so the 1943 National Pact sought to mitigate the chance of ivil war and sectarian violence. Based upon the 1932 census that stated 51% of the population was Christian, the pact laid out the foundations for modern day Lebanon as a multiconfessional state with Maronite Christians agreeing to an Arab, not Western Lebanon, Muslims abandoning any aspirations for uniting with Syria, the President to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister to be a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker to be Shia, the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Speaker to be Greek Orthodox with an overall ratio of Christians to Muslims being 6:5 in parliament.

Although the French heavily favoured Maronite Christians in part due to historic ties dating back to the Crusades, sectarian violence remained limited. Even after independence, the fine balance remained largely in place despite the domination of Maronites in parliament although this was threatened in the 1958 crisis that saw pan-Arab Muslims push the pro-west Christian President Chamoun to join with Nasser’s United Arab Republic after being emboldened by the Suez Crisis and the toppling of Iraq’s pro-west government. However, the issues were resolved when the compromise candidate of Faud Chehab was chosen as the next president.

Despite being a Maronite Christian, General Chehab refused orders for the Lebanese Military to take action against Pan-Arab Muslim insurgents in the 1958 Lebanese Crisis thus earned respect of Lebanese Muslims. Under his presidency, Chehab invested greatly in Lebanon’s deprived non-Christian areas, helped oversee a boom in Lebanon’s economy, expanded social services, eliminated discrimination of Muslims in bureaucratic posts, strengthened security forces to reduce foreign influence after a failed attempt of a coup by Syria and acted as a mediator between various religious as well as secular groups. However once Chehab’s tenure came to an end, he refused to allow the Lebanese constitution to be amended which would’ve allowed him to serve more terms, instead passing on power to Charles Herou. Although Herou continued with most of his predecessor’s policies, cracks soon began to appear.

The only demographic survey taken place in Modern Lebanon was the 1932 Census and it became the bedrock of the new independent Lebanon with its statistics key in the formation of the 1943 National Pact, but the possibility of any new census was out of the question due to the potential political consequences it could have. However by the 1960’s the demographics in Lebanon had shifted dramatically and despite Chehab’s reforms, not enough had been done to rectify the deepening divides and the imbalance between Christians and Muslims in parliament.

One of the biggest reasons behind this demographic shift was the 300,000 Palestinian refugees residing in refugee camps in Lebanon’s south that accounted for 10% of the country’s population. This shift of Lebanon towards a majority Muslim country (also influenced by higher birth-rates among Muslims) and the presence of 300,000 poor, landless, poorly educated, bitter Palestinians posed a huge threat to Lebanon’s fragile stability. This was only made worse by the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from Jordan who relocated to Southern Lebanon. There the PLO began to recruit with relative ease from refugee camps where they formed a ‘state within a state’ and began to step up insurgency attacks against Israel such as the 1972 Munich Massacre and plane hijackings. Israeli retaliations and the harsh PLO rule of their ‘state within a state’ in turn drove local poor, rural Shia Muslims to Beirut where they settled in a ‘poverty belt’ around the city.

Unlike the Jordanians who were able to expel the PLO with force, Lebanon’s military wasn’t strong enough (with strict ratios between different religions enforced) and after the narrow defeat of Chehab’s protégé Sarkis by the traditional feudal Maronite clan leader Frangieh hopes for a resolution to the various crises seemed slim. Through the 1970’s the fabric of Lebanese society began to collapse with multiple militias arising and sectarian violence growing. Despite the election of Sarkis in 1976, he was unable to mediate effectively due to interference from foreign powers such as Syria, Israel, Libya and Egypt and a large rise in conflict between the numerous sectarian groups.

14 years of war would follow that would tear Lebanon apart, resulting in the deaths of 150,000 people and 900,000 displaced from their homes. A hugely multifaceted conflict, the civil war saw Maronite, Shia, Sunni, Druze, secular, Israel and Syrian forces fight each other and themselves, before finally ending in 1989 with the Taif Agreement. The peace deal sought to prevent such a war from breaking out again by giving the Sunni Muslim Prime Minister more powers and changing the ratio of Christians to Muslims in parliament to 50:50.

However, there was nothing the agreement could do to rectify the deep scars left behind by the civil war. Where once religious groups were able to live in the same area peacefully, the war displaced people, thus reinforcing these religious, sectarian differences geographically. The task at the hand of the Lebanese government included the end to political sectarianism, the disarmament of numerous powerful, wealthy militias (with the exception of Hezbollah who were considered a “resistance group” against Israel), many of whom had delved into organised crime, and rebuilding Lebanon’s previously prosperous economy from scratch.

Lebanon’s revival would be hampered by the Syrian army occupation of Lebanon who would continue to meddle in Lebanese politics until being forced out by the popular Cedar Revolution in 2006 following the assassination of Lebanese politician Hariri.

Although the PLO had been driven out of Lebanon, there’d been a major development in the south of the country. In response to the Israeli Occupation in Lebanon and spurred on by the Islamic Iranian Revolution of 1979, Hezbollah had emerged during the civil war as a very powerful, clerical Shia militia group trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Even after Taif, Israel continued their occupation and military activities against Hezbollah who were the only militia group not to be disbanded in part due to Lebanese popular support for the ‘resistance group’ even among Christians and Sunni Muslims.

After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah continued their fight against Israel when in 2006, in response to a Hezbollah attack that killed 8 Israeli soldiers. Israel launched another invasion of Southern Lebanon which would result in the deaths of 1,100 of Lebanese and the displacement of a million people. Both sides claimed victory, but Israel; failed to eliminate the threat of Hezbollah and inadvertently boosted public support for the organisation. When the government tried to curb Hezbollah’s influence in 2008 by closing down its private telecoms network, they took over the west of Beirut until the government was forced to give way. Hezbollah were now firmly here to stay.

However recent developments within the Middle East over the past few years has seen Lebanon, still highly sectarian after the civil war, once again become a potential flashpoint in the region. Even before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and the escalation in the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Lebanon had not fully recovered. The country hadn’t even been able to pass a budget since 2005 (until March of this year) due to political stalemate and corruption. Then in 2011, the Syrian civil war broke out.

The most immediate impact the civil war has had on Lebanon is the huge numbers of refugees flooding into Lebanon, putting further strain on an already weak, debt-ridden economy. As of now, roughly 1.5 million Syrian Refugees reside within Lebanon adding on to the 450,000 Palestinian refugees already living in Lebanon. Now roughly 25% of Lebanon’s population is made up of registered refugees (who are unable to work in as many as 20 professions legally or vote) and this 30-50% increase in Lebanon’s workforce has resulted in an increase in unemployment to 20%. Adding to this, Syria’s civil war has created a great deal of uncertainty, reducing investment in Lebanon and Syria’s collapsing economy has harmed Lebanese exports with annual real GDP growth in Lebanon falling from 8% prior to the outbreak of war to roughly 1-2% today.

Another recent development that has occurred is Hezbollah’s rapid growth. The Syrian Civil War, a conflict with basis in the enmity of the Sunni majority against the ruling Shia minority, has seen Hezbollah fighters help prop up Assad’s regime with military support from Iran. This has seen the organisation transform from a militia resistance group into an effective military organisation, using tanks, guided missiles and drones in addition to gaining invaluable combat experience. With Iranian backed militias in Iraq pushing back IS, Iran is pushing westward to link up with Syria and Hezbollah in a “Shia crescent” which would allow Iran to more easily supply Hezbollah with military equipment.

With President Assad now looking ever more likely to emerge out of the civil war victorious saved by the interventions of both Russia and Iran, Syria will likely offer a large role to Iran in its post war construction and a base of operation for Hezbollah to operate from without fear of conflict with the government. Israeli intelligence now estimate that Hezbollah have built up a stockpile of at least 100,000 rockets and recently at the UN, Netanyahu has accused Iran of building precision guided missile production sites in both Syria and Lebanon. As a result, Netanyahu is reaching out to Russia, the other key component in Assad’s recent success, for support in curbing Iranian influence in Syria.

Trump’s election in America has done little to calm things down. During the election campaign, Trump stated the Iran Nuclear Deal as being “an embarrassment to the United States” and “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into”. If Trump’s election rhetoric on the Iran Nuclear deal is followed up by American withdrawal, it could result in Iran’s nuclear programme restarting and Trump would find it difficult to organise sanctions against Iran after spending years negotiating with China, Russia and Europe to come to the agreement.

Although this situation is very unlikely, Trump’s stance in the Middle East is muddled bar his support for Israel and hatred for IS and any diplomatic blunders could once again send tensions sky high in the region. On the other hand if Trump fails to present a clear stance in regards to the Middle East US allies in the region will be unsettled and Iran could grow stronger. If Iran do restart their nuclear programme due to diplomatic failings, Israel could decide to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran as they did against Syria and Iraq in 2007 and 1981 respectively, Iran would be able to order Hezbollah, their proxy, to launch a devastating all-out war against Israel using their combat experience and equipment from the Syrian Civil War.

With numerous Hezbollah members and allies making up the cabinet and vast public support for the organisation due to their work in resisting Israel and against Sunni Jihadists in Syria, Hezbollah have become a major part in the fabric of Lebanese society whether the government likes it or not. As well as by presenting themselves as a national, Lebanese organisation through their actions rather than a religious one, Hezbollah have also used the huge influx of 1.5 million, largely Sunni, Syrian refugees to advance themselves politically by convincing Christians, including the new Christian president Aoun (who used to an anti-Syrian Christian warlord and Prime Minister during the Civil War), to become more pro-Assad in the hope that Syrian refugees will return back to Syria upon an Assad victory.

This recent growth in strength of Hezbollah has undermined the government and resulted in Lebanon not condemning the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016 which greatly angered Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia are the fourth major stakeholder in Lebanese affairs and the Sunni kingdom has been engaged in a cold war with Iran over influence in the Middle East with Syria and Yemen (where Hezbollah have sent sellswords to fight in support of Iranian backed Houthis) acting as proxy theatres. Lebanon, home to similar numbers of Shia and Sunni Muslims, has also been unable to avoid becoming yet another battleground between the two regional powers.

In February 2016, Saudi Arabia suspended $4 billion in funding for Lebanon’s military and security forces in response to Lebanon’s failure to condemn an attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran, a move seen by many as a sign that Lebanon was now firmly in Iran’s pocket. This was followed up by Gulf States beginning to cut off their aid to Lebanon, contributing further to Lebanon’s economic crisis. However this move has simply reduced Saudi influence in Lebanon and thus strengthened Hezbollah’s hand.

This growing strength in Hezbollah’s influence has ostracised many Sunni Muslims in Lebanon who make up 27% of Lebanon’s population. Unlike the Shia, they lack any powerful militia that supports them and due to spill over from the civil war in Syria, ever more have become radicalised and some have joined Sunni gangs with links to Syrian rebel groups. Where once, pre-civil war, the majority of conflict was between the politically dominant Christians and Muslims, the volatile climate in the modern day Middle East has seen Sunni and Shia Muslims start to come into ever greater conflict, with their hatred of Israel, the main unifying factor.

The numbers of terrorist attacks has increased with most of them targeted at either Sunni or Shia dominated areas, most notably in the 2015 Beirut Bombings carried out by IS against Shia Muslims that left 43 dead. Although the memories of the devastating 15 year civil war and the selection of Maronite Michel Aoun to fill the vacant presidency after 2 years of gridlock in November 2016 have calmed tensions between the two groups, they could still rise again especially if the Syrian conflict fails to be resolved, the economy continues to falter or if there is further development in the growing conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Moreover a war between Israel and Hezbollah is unlikely to occur at least until the Syrian Civil War has reached its end with both Iran and Hezbollah engaged in other conflicts. Israel have also strengthened themselves since their last war with Hezbollah in 2006 with the new anti-missile Iron Dome air defence network and Hezbollah will be wary to perform any aggressive moves such as the attack on Israeli soldiers that sparked off the 2006 war with Israel.

Moreover Israel will not wish to take aggressive action against Hezbollah without provocation having little to gain since the organisation has firmly become a part of Lebanese society. In addition military action could simply increase popular support for Hezbollah as was the case after their occupation of Lebanon during the civil war and their war with Hezbollah in 2006. This conscious knowledge of the scale of Arab hatred towards the state of Israel has been factor in Israel’s decision to deliver aid to Syrians in the Golan Heights on the border with Israel in the hope of changing hearts and minds. However if Hezbollah manage to consolidate their gains in Syria and Assad begins to reassert complete control over his shattered nation and no new proxy conflict has emerged between Iran and Saudi Arabia, an estimated 30,000 trained Hezbollah soldiers will return to Lebanon to await orders from Tehran and they’ll never be better prepared for war with Israel.

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